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JMJ
Introduction
This is a topic that evokes strong emotions and really needs to be examined rationally in the light of Catholic Doctrine as opposed to emotion or ignorance.
Lifesite news has a video by Mother Miriam {Lifesite News: Mother Miriam Pontificating on Morality of Vaccines (Skip to: 2:17)} where she claims that the bishops have compromised and Catholics should not receive the COVID-19 vaccines. Frankly, I've listened to Mother one time before when she pontificated about the SSPX. She was objectively wrong, since the situation canonically has change.
Her pontifications in this case are simply that, without any basis makes her claims based on her own 'authority'.
As with the crisis of the Catholic Church, the COVID-19 crisis is not a reason to set aside Catholic Principles.
Analysis
First the facts.
Fact 1: Cell lines derived from aborted babies are used in some vaccine development.
At least five of the candidate COVID-19 vaccines use one of two human fetal cell lines: HEK-293, a kidney cell line widely used in research and industry that comes from a fetus aborted in about 1972; and PER.C6, a proprietary cell line owned by Janssen, a subsidiary of Johnson & Johnson, developed from retinal cells from an 18-week-old fetus aborted in 1985. Both cell lines were developed in the lab of molecular biologist Alex van der Eb at Leiden University. Two of the five vaccines have entered human trials (see table, below).Source
So, if you see HEK-293 or PER.C6 in the development of the vaccine, then the vaccine is morally tainted - at least at this point. Over time, some vaccines can be shifted to morally acceptable production processes.
Fact 2: Vaccines do not contain human cells. The cells are used to produce components of the vaccines. Source
- When viruses grow in cells, the cells are killed because in most cases the new viruses burst the cells to be released.
- Once the vaccine virus is grown, it is purified, so that cellular debris and growth reagents are removed.
- During this process of purification, any remaining cellular DNA is also broken down. To learn more about DNA and vaccine, visit the “Vaccine ingredients – DNA” page.
Fact 3: This issue has already been addressed by the Catholic Church and in particular in the application of St.Thomas Aquinas' principle of the double effect as described in 2005 (see Moral Reflections and references). Some may not like the answer of the authority and prior to simply tossing it, they need to consider the reasoning within the decision and the actions that need to result. This will be the subject of following articles.
Fact 3: Catholic can be 'party' to a sin by a number of methods (cooperation in evil). In this case the immoral act took place decades ago, so it becomes a little more complicated and 'remote'.
In the next articles I plan on breaking down St. Thomas' principle of double effect and the Vatican's rationale.
P^3
References
Moral Reflections on Vaccines Prepared from Cells Derived from Aborted Human Foetuses
Mrs Debra L.Vinnedge Vatican City, June 9 2005 Dear Mrs Debra L.Vinnedge, On June 4, 2003, you wrote to His Eminence Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, with a copy of this letter forwarded to me, asking to the Sacred Congregation of the Doctrine of Faith a clarification about the liceity of vaccinating children with vaccines prepared using cell lines derived from aborted human fetuses. Your question regarded in particular the right of the parents of these children to oppose such a vaccination when made at school, mandated by law. As there were no formal guidelines by the magisterium concerning that topic, you said that catholic parents were often challenged by State Courts, Health Officials and School Administrators when they filled religious exemptions for their children to this type of vaccination. This Pontifical Academy for Life, carrying out the commission entrusted to us by the Congregation for the Doctrine of Faith, in answer to your request, has proceeded to a careful examination of the question of these "tainted" vaccines, and has produced as a result a study (in Italian) that has been realized with the help of a group of experts. This study has been approved as such by the Congregation and we send you, there enclosed, an English translation of a synthesis of this study. This synthesis can be brought to the knowledge of the interested officials and organisms. A documented paper on the topic will be published in the journal "Medicina e Morale", edited by the Centra di Bioetica della Universita Cattolica in Rome. The study, its synthesis, and the translation of this material took some time. We apologize for the delay. With my best regards, Sincerely yours,
00193 Roma - Via della Conciliazione, 1 - Tel. 06 698.82423 - 06 698.81693 - Fax 06 698.82014 MORAL REFLECTIONS The matter in question regards the lawfulness of production, distribution and use of certain vaccines whose production is connected with acts of procured abortion. It concerns vaccines containing live viruses which have been prepared from human cell lines of foetal origin, using tissues from aborted human foetuses as a source of such cells. The best known, and perhaps the most important due to its vast distribution and its use on an almost universal level, is the vaccine against Rubella (German measles). Rubella and its vaccine Rubella (German measles)1 is a viral illness caused by a Togavirus of the genus Rubivirus and is characterized by a maculopapular rash. It consists of an infection which is common in infancy and has no clinical manifestations in one case out of two, is self-limiting and usually benign. Nonetheless, the German measles virus is one of the most pathological infective agents for the embryo and foetus. When a woman catches the infection during pregnancy, especially during the first trimester, the risk of foetal infection is very high (approximately 95%). The virus replicates itself in the placenta and infects the foetus, causing the constellation of abnormalities denoted by the name of Congenital Rubella Syndrome. For example, the severe epidemic of German measles which affected a huge part of the United States in 1964 thus caused 20,000 cases of congenital rubella2, resulting in 11,250 abortions (spontaneous or surgical), 2,100 neonatal deaths, 11,600 cases of deafness, 3,580 cases of blindness, 1,800 cases of mental retardation. It was this epidemic that pushed for the development and introduction on the market of an effective vaccine against rubella, thus permitting an effective prophylaxis against this infection. The severity of congenital rubella and the handicaps which it causes justify systematic vaccination against such a sickness. It is very difficult, perhaps even impossible, to avoid the infection of a pregnant woman, even if the rubella infection of a person in contact with this woman is diagnosed from the first day of the eruption of the rash. Therefore, one tries to prevent transmission by suppressing the reservoir of infection among children who have not been vaccinated, by means of early immunization of all children (universal vaccination). Universal vaccination has resulted in a considerable fall in the incidence of congenital rubella, with a general incidence reduced to less than 5 cases per 100,000 livebirths. Nevertheless, this progress remains fragile. In the United States, for example, after an overwhelming reduction in the number of cases of congenital rubella to only a few cases annually, i.e. less than 0.1 per 100,000 live births, a new epidemic wave came on in 1991, with an incidence that rose to 0.8/100,000. Such waves of resurgence of German measles were also seen in 1997 and in the year 2000. These periodic episodes of resurgence make it evident that there is a persistent circulation of the virus among young adults, which is the consequence of insufficient vaccination coverage. The latter situation allows a significant proportion of vulnerable subjects to persist, who are a source of periodic epidemics which put women in the fertile age group who have not been immunized at risk. Therefore, the reduction to the point of eliminating congenital rubella is considered a priority in public health care. Vaccines currently produced using human cell lines that come from aborted foetuses To date, there are two human diploid cell lines which were originally prepared from tissues of aborted foetuses (in 1964 and 1970) and are used for the preparation of vaccines based on live attenuated virus: the first one is the WI-38 line (Winstar Institute 38), with human diploid lung fibroblasts, coming from a female foetus that was aborted because the family felt they had too many children (G. Sven et al., 1969). It was prepared and developed by Leonard Hayflick in 1964 (L. Hayflick, 1965; G. Sven et al., 1969)3 and bears the ATCC number CCL-75. WI-38 has been used for the preparation of the historical vaccine RA 27/3 against rubella (S.A. Plotkin et al, 1965)4. The second human cell line is MRC-5 (Medical Research Council 5) (human, lung, embryonic) (ATCC number CCL-171), with human lung fibroblasts coming from a 14 week male foetus aborted for "psychiatric reasons" from a 27 year old woman in the UK. MRC-5 was prepared and developed by J.P. Jacobs in 1966 (J.P. Jacobs et al, 1970)5. Other human cell lines have been developed for pharmaceutical needs, but are not involved in the vaccines actually available6. The vaccines that are incriminated today as using human cell lines from aborted foetuses, WI-38 and MRC-5, are the following:7 A) Live vaccines against rubella8:
B) Other vaccines, also prepared using human cell lines from aborted foetuses:
The position of the ethical problem related to these vaccines From the point of view of prevention of viral diseases such as German measles, mumps, measles, chicken pox and hepatitis A, it is clear that the making of effective vaccines against diseases such as these, as well as their use in the fight against these infections, up to the point of eradication, by means of an obligatory vaccination of all the population at risk, undoubtedly represents a "milestone" in the secular fight of man against infective and contagious diseases. However, as the same vaccines are prepared from viruses taken from the tissues of foetuses that had been infected and voluntarily aborted, and the viruses were subsequently attenuated and cultivated from human cell lines which come likewise from procured abortions, they do not cease to pose ethical problems. The need to articulate a moral reflection on the matter in question arises mainly from the connection which exists between the vaccines mentioned above and the procured abortions from which biological material necessary for their preparation was obtained. If someone rejects every form of voluntary abortion of human foetuses, would such a person not contradict himself/herself by allowing the use of these vaccines of live attenuated viruses on their children? Would it not be a matter of true (and illicit) cooperation in evil, even though this evil was carried out forty years ago? Before proceeding to consider this specific case, we need to recall briefly the
principles assumed in classical moral doctrine with regard to the problem of
cooperation in evil 9, a problem which arises every time that a moral agent
perceives the existence of a link between his own acts and a morally evil action
carried out by others. The first fundamental distinction to be made is that between formal and material cooperation. Formal cooperation is carried out when the moral agent cooperates with the immoral action of another person, sharing in the latter's evil intention. On the other hand, when a moral agent cooperates with the immoral action of another person, without sharing his/her evil intention, it is a case of material cooperation. Material cooperation can be further divided into categories of immediate (direct) and mediate (indirect), depending on whether the cooperation is in the execution of the sinful action per se, or whether the agent acts by fulfilling the conditions - either by providing instruments or products - which make it possible to commit the immoral act. Furthermore, forms of proximate cooperation and remote cooperation can be distinguished, in relation to the "distance" (be it in terms of temporal space or material connection) between the act of cooperation and the sinful act committed by someone else. Immediate material cooperation is always proximate, while mediate material cooperation can be either proximate or remote. Formal cooperation is always morally illicit because it represents a form of direct and intentional participation in the sinful action of another person.10 Material cooperation can sometimes be illicit (depending on the conditions of the "double effect" or "indirect voluntary" action), but when immediate material cooperation concerns grave attacks on human life, it is always to be considered illicit, given the precious nature of the value in question11. A further distinction made in classical morality is that between active (or positive) cooperation in evil and passive (or negative) cooperation in evil, the former referring to the performance of an act of cooperation in a sinful action that is carried out by another person, while the latter refers to the omission of an act of denunciation or impediment of a sinful action carried out by another person, insomuch as there was a moral duty to do that which was omitted12. Passive cooperation can also be formal or material, immediate or mediate, proximate or remote. Obviously, every type of formal passive cooperation is to be considered illicit, but even passive material cooperation should generally be avoided, although it is admitted (by many authors) that there is not a rigorous obligation to avoid it in a case in which it would be greatly difficult to do so. Application to the use of vaccines prepared from cells coming from embryos or foetuses aborted voluntarily In the specific case under examination, there are three categories of people who are involved in the cooperation in evil, evil which is obviously represented by the action of a voluntary abortion performed by others: a) those who prepare the vaccines using human cell lines coming from voluntary abortions; b) those who participate in the mass marketing of such vaccines; c) those who need to use them for health reasons. Firstly, one must consider morally illicit every form of formal cooperation (sharing the evil intention) in the action of those who have performed a voluntary abortion, which in turn has allowed the retrieval of foetal tissues, required for the preparation of vaccines. Therefore, whoever - regardless of the category to which he belongs — cooperates in some way, sharing its intention, to the performance of a voluntary abortion with the aim of producing the above-mentioned vaccines, participates, in actuality, in the same moral evil as the person who has performed that abortion. Such participation would also take place in the case where someone, sharing the intention of the abortion, refrains from denouncing or criticizing this illicit action, although having the moral duty to do so (passive formal cooperation). In a case where there is no such formal sharing of the immoral intention of the person who has performed the abortion, any form of cooperation would be material, with the following specifications. As regards the preparation, distribution and marketing of vaccines produced as a result of the use of biological material whose origin is connected with cells coming from foetuses voluntarily aborted, such a process is stated, as a matter of principle, morally illicit, because it could contribute in encouraging the performance of other voluntary abortions, with the purpose of the production of such vaccines. Nevertheless, it should be recognized that, within the chain of production-distribution-marketing, the various cooperating agents can have different moral responsibilities. However, there is another aspect to be considered, and that is the form of passive material cooperation which would be carried out by the producers of these vaccines, if they do not denounce and reject publicly the original immoral act (the voluntary abortion), and if they do not dedicate themselves together to research and promote alternative ways, exempt from moral evil, for the production of vaccines for the same infections. Such passive material cooperation, if it should occur, is equally illicit. As regards those who need to use such vaccines for reasons of health, it must be emphasized that, apart from every form of formal cooperation, in general, doctors or parents who resort to the use of these vaccines for their children, in spite of knowing their origin (voluntary abortion), carry out a form of very remote mediate material cooperation, and thus very mild, in the performance of the original act of abortion, and a mediate material cooperation, with regard to the marketing of cells coming from abortions, and immediate, with regard to the marketing of vaccines produced with such cells. The cooperation is therefore more intense on the part of the authorities and national health systems that accept the use of the vaccines. However, in this situation, the aspect of passive cooperation is that which stands out most. It is up to the faithful and citizens of upright conscience (fathers of families, doctors, etc.) to oppose, even by making an objection of conscience, the ever more widespread attacks against life and the "culture of death" which underlies them. From this point of view, the use of vaccines whose production is connected with procured abortion constitutes at least a mediate remote passive material cooperation to the abortion, and an immediate passive material cooperation with regard to their marketing. Furthermore, on a cultural level, the use of such vaccines contributes in the creation of a generalized social consensus to the operation of the pharmaceutical industries which produce them in an immoral way. Therefore, doctors and fathers of families have a duty to take recourse to alternative vaccines13 (if they exist), putting pressure on the political authorities and health systems so that other vaccines without moral problems become available. They should take recourse, if necessary, to the use of conscientious objection14 with regard to the use of vaccines produced by means of cell lines of aborted human foetal origin. Equally, they should oppose by all means (in writing, through the various associations, mass media, etc.) the vaccines which do not yet have morally acceptable alternatives, creating pressure so that alternative vaccines are prepared, which are not connected with the abortion of a human foetus, and requesting rigorous legal control of the pharmaceutical industry producers. As regards the diseases against which there are no alternative vaccines which are available and ethically acceptable, it is right to abstain from using these vaccines if it can be done without causing children, and indirectly the population as a whole, to undergo significant risks to their health. However, if the latter are exposed to considerable dangers to their health, vaccines with moral problems pertaining to them may also be used on a temporary basis. The moral reason is that the duty to avoid passive material cooperation is not obligatory if there is grave inconvenience. Moreover, we find, in such a case, a proportional reason, in order to accept the use of these vaccines in the presence of the danger of favouring the spread of the pathological agent, due to the lack of vaccination of children. This is particularly true in the case of vaccination against German measles15. In any case, there remains a moral duty to continue to fight and to employ every lawful means in order to make life difficult for the pharmaceutical industries which act unscrupulously and unethically. However, the burden of this important battle cannot and must not fall on innocent children and on the health situation of the population - especially with regard to pregnant women. To summarize, it must be confirmed that:
References
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Immunization Action Coalition
1573
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Paul MN 55104
E-mail: admin@immunize.org Web:
http://www.immunize.org/
Tel: (651) 647-9009Fax:
(651) 647-9131
EWTN: The Principle of Double Effect
The Principle of Double Effect is used to determine when an action which has two effects, one good and one evil, may still be chosen without sin. This principle is attributed to St. Thomas Aquinas, who used it to show that killing in self-defense is justified (Summa Theologiae I-II q64 art. 7).
With respect to voting, it would allow under certain conditions the toleration of the unintended evil of another for a proportionate reason. All four conditions must be satisfied:
- The action must be morally good, or indifferent, as to object, motive and circumstances.
- The bad effect(s) may only be tolerated, not directly willed.
- The good effect must be caused at least as directly as the bad.
- The good effect(s) must be proportionate to compensate for the bad effect(s).
1. The action must be morally good, or indifferent, as to object, motive and circumstances
Catechism of the Catholic Church 1755
A morally good act requires the goodness of the object, of the end, and of the circumstances together. An evil end [motive] corrupts the action, even if the object is good in itself (such as praying and fasting "in order to be seen by men"). The object of the choice can by itself vitiate an act in its entirety. There are some concrete acts - such as fornication - that it is always wrong to choose, because choosing them entails a disorder of the will, that is, a moral evil.
Catechism of the Catholic Church 1756
It is therefore an error to judge the morality of human acts by considering only the intention that inspires them or the circumstances (environment, social pressure, duress or emergency, etc.) which supply their context.
Voting is a morally good action, but voting for any candidate, for any office, is typically to accept the good the candidate will do if elected, along with any evil he intends to do or may do. In determining the bad effects that may have to be tolerated, primacy of consideration belongs to the Non-Negotiables (life, marriage and family, religious freedom), since complex negotiable issues involve opinions about means, not essential goods/intrinsic evils.
2. The evil effect(s) must not be directly willed, only tolerated
Catechism of the Catholic Church 1737
An effect can be tolerated without being willed by its agent; for instance, a mother's exhaustion from tending her sick child. A bad effect is not imputable if it was not willed either as an end or as a means of an action, e.g., a death a person incurs in aiding someone in danger. For a bad effect to be imputable it must be foreseeable and the agent must have the possibility of avoiding it, as in the case of manslaughter caused by a drunken driver.
Catechism of the Catholic Church 1756
... There are acts which, in and of themselves, independently of circumstances and intentions, are always gravely illicit by reason of their object; such as blasphemy and perjury, murder and adultery. One may not do evil so that good may result from it. [intrinsically evil means are different than unwilled effects]
"One may not do evil that good may come of it," is an ancient axiom of morality. As noted under the subject of moral cooperation, we may not formally will another’s evil, provide immediate material support for it, or even mediate material support. We may, however, tolerate it as remote mediate material cooperation, but only when there is a serious proportion, as discussed under no. 4 below.
Such unintended evil effects are morally different than using evil means to achieve an end. Something that is used as a means is by its nature intended.
3. The good effect must be caused at least as directly as the bad.
Catechism of the Catholic Church 1737
An effect can be tolerated without being willed by its agent; for instance, a mother's exhaustion from tending her sick child. A bad effect is not imputable if it was not willed either as an end or as a means of an action, e.g., a death a person incurs in aiding someone in danger. For a bad effect to be imputable it must be foreseeable and the agent must have the possibility of avoiding it, as in the case of manslaughter caused by a drunken driver.
The directness meant in this principle refers to causality, not time. In the Catechism’s example the same action which provides care for the child also causes the harm to the mother. In the use of medicine or radiation for treatment, the bad effects often occur before the good of health is attained. Yet, in both cases, the effects proceed as directly from the cause.
4. The good effect(s) must be proportionate to compensate for the bad effect(s)
This is the principal of proportionality. It forbids the toleration of effects that are not seriously proportionate to the good effects that are expected from the action.
Establishing a just wage for workers is desirable by Catholic social teaching. However, this good effect can never be proportionate enough to compensate for the evil of abortion, the attack on marriage and family, or the loss of religious freedom (the Non-Negotiables). These are categorically and qualitatively different goods.
Therefore, a basket of non-negotiables improving the quality of life of hundreds of millions cannot justify the toleration of the killing of one million human beings annually through abortion. This is an absurd calculus, that those who employ it would reject if applied in many historical contexts in which millions were killed to achieve economic and other political objective.
Stanford University Article
Stanford University: Doctrine of Double Effect
St. Thomas Aquinas: Summa Theologica
Whether it is lawful to kill a man in self-defense?, St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Second Part of the Second Part, Question 64, Article 7.
Article 7: Whether it is lawful to kill a man in self-defense?
Objection 1: It would seem that nobody may lawfully kill a man in
self-defense. For Augustine says to Publicola (Ep. xlvii): "I do not
agree with the opinion that one may kill a man lest one be killed by him;
unless one be a soldier, exercise a public office, so that one does it
not for oneself but for others, having the power to do so, provided it be
in keeping with one's person." Now he who kills a man in self-defense,
kills him lest he be killed by him. Therefore this would seem to be
unlawful.
Objection 2: Further, he says (De Lib. Arb. i, 5): "How are they free from sin
in sight of Divine providence, who are guilty of taking a man's life for
the sake of these contemptible things?" Now among contemptible things he
reckons "those which men may forfeit unwillingly," as appears from the
context (De Lib. Arb. i, 5): and the chief of these is the life of the
body. Therefore it is unlawful for any man to take another's life for the
sake of the life of his own body.
Objection 3: Further, Pope Nicolas [*Nicolas I, Dist. 1, can. De his clericis]
says in the Decretals: "Concerning the clerics about whom you have
consulted Us, those, namely, who have killed a pagan in self-defense, as
to whether, after making amends by repenting, they may return to their
former state, or rise to a higher degree; know that in no case is it
lawful for them to kill any man under any circumstances whatever." Now
clerics and laymen are alike bound to observe the moral precepts.
Therefore neither is it lawful for laymen to kill anyone in self-defense.
Objection 4: Further, murder is a more grievous sin than fornication or
adultery. Now nobody may lawfully commit simple fornication or adultery
or any other mortal sin in order to save his own life; since the
spiritual life is to be preferred to the life of the body. Therefore no
man may lawfully take another's life in self-defense in order to save his
own life.
Objection 5: Further, if the tree be evil, so is the fruit, according to Mt.
7:17. Now self-defense itself seems to be unlawful, according to Rm.
12:19: "Not defending [Douay: 'revenging'] yourselves, my dearly
beloved." Therefore its result, which is the slaying of a man, is also
unlawful.
On the contrary, It is written (Ex. 22:2): "If a thief be found
breaking into a house or undermining it, and be wounded so as to die; he
that slew him shall not be guilty of blood." Now it is much more lawful
to defend one's life than one's house. Therefore neither is a man guilty
of murder if he kill another in defense of his own life.
I answer that, Nothing hinders one act from having two effects, only one
of which is intended, while the other is beside the intention. Now moral
acts take their species according to what is intended, and not according
to what is beside the intention, since this is accidental as explained
above (Question [43], Article [3]; FS, Question [12], Article [1]). Accordingly the act of self-defense
may have two effects, one is the saving of one's life, the other is the
slaying of the aggressor. Therefore this act, since one's intention is to
save one's own life, is not unlawful, seeing that it is natural to
everything to keep itself in "being," as far as possible. And yet, though
proceeding from a good intention, an act may be rendered unlawful, if it
be out of proportion to the end. Wherefore if a man, in self-defense,
uses more than necessary violence, it will be unlawful: whereas if he
repel force with moderation his defense will be lawful, because according
to the jurists [*Cap. Significasti, De Homicid. volunt. vel casual.], "it
is lawful to repel force by force, provided one does not exceed the
limits of a blameless defense." Nor is it necessary for salvation that a
man omit the act of moderate self-defense in order to avoid killing the
other man, since one is bound to take more care of one's own life than of
another's. But as it is unlawful to take a man's life, except for the
public authority acting for the common good, as stated above (Article [3]), it
is not lawful for a man to intend killing a man in self-defense, except
for such as have public authority, who while intending to kill a man in
self-defense, refer this to the public good, as in the case of a soldier
fighting against the foe, and in the minister of the judge struggling
with robbers, although even these sin if they be moved by private
animosity.
Reply to Objection 1: The words quoted from Augustine refer to the case when one
man intends to kill another to save himself from death. The passage
quoted in the Second Objection is to be understood in the same sense.
Hence he says pointedly, "for the sake of these things," whereby he
indicates the intention. This suffices for the Reply to the Second
Objection.
Reply to Objection 3: Irregularity results from the act though sinless of taking
a man's life, as appears in the case of a judge who justly condemns a man
to death. For this reason a cleric, though he kill a man in self-defense,
is irregular, albeit he intends not to kill him, but to defend himself.
Reply to Objection 4: The act of fornication or adultery is not necessarily
directed to the preservation of one's own life, as is the act whence
sometimes results the taking of a man's life.
Reply to Objection 5: The defense forbidden in this passage is that which comes from revengeful spite. Hence a gloss says: "Not defending yourselves---that is, not striking your enemy back."
The Catholic Answer to Vaccines
For some vaccines there are no morally produced brands. In the United States, these vaccines are MMR, hepatitis A, and varicella. So should we use these vaccines, when there is no alternative?
In the 2005 document, The Pontifical Academy for Life says we can use them “on a temporary basis” and “insomuch as is necessary in order to avoid a serious risk not only for one’s own children but also, and perhaps more specifically, for the health conditions of the population as a whole – especially for pregnant women.” In the 2017 document, the Pontifical Academy for life writes, “Especially in consideration of the fact that the cell lines currently used are very distant from the original abortions and no longer imply that bond of moral cooperation indispensable for an ethically negative evaluation of their use. On the other hand, the moral obligation to guarantee the vaccination coverage necessary for the safety of others is no less urgent, especially the safety more vulnerable subjects such as pregnant women and those affected by immunodeficiency who cannot be vaccinated against these diseases.”
It is not necessary to use new aborted fetal tissue to continue to manufacture existing vaccines. Unfortunately, new cell lines derived from fetal tissues are still be developed and used for new vaccines and pharmaceuticals, including some COVID-19 vaccines. The 2005 document implores all of us to “oppose by all means (in writing, through the various associations, mass media, etc.) the vaccines which do not yet have morally acceptable alternatives, creating pressure so that alternative vaccines are prepared, which are not connected with the abortion of a human foetus, and requesting legal control of the pharmaceutical industry producers.”
MyCatholicDoctor recommends this sample letter which can be sent to pharmaceutical companies to voice your views regarding human diploid cell line vaccines (courtesy of Dr. Elizabeth Abraham MD, MS and Mrs. Danielle Abril).
Resources
- The Pontifical Academy for Life (PDF)
- CONGREGATION FOR THE DOCTRINE OF THE FAITH INSTRUCTION DIGNITAS PERSONAE ON CERTAIN BIOETHICAL QUESTIONS, especially paragraphs 34-35
- The United States Conference of Catholic Bishops (PDF)
- The Catholic Medical Association (PDF)
- National Catholic Bioethics Center statement
Other Links
Which COVID-19 Vaccines Are Being Developed with Fetal Cell Lines Derived from Aborted Babies?
Bioethics groups warn against COVID-19 vaccine made from aborted fetuses
Principle of Double Effect: Fallopian Pregnancy
Question:
Answer:
Moral actions that produce two effects need to be evaluated under the Catholic understanding of the principle of double effect:
- The action must be either morally good or neutral.
- The bad effect must not be the means by which the good effect is achieved.
- The intention must be the achieving of only the good effect; the bad effect can in no way be intended and must be avoided if possible.
- The good effect must be at least equivalent in proportion to the bad effect.
An ectopic pregnancy occurs when the fertilized ovum implants in the fallopian tube or in some other location. A mother facing a tubal pregnancy risks imminent rupture of the fallopian tube and thus there exists a danger to both the life of the mother and the child.
Removing the fallopian tube is considered in accordance with the principle of double effect:
- Removing a part of the body that is about to rupture and cause the death of the individual is a morally good action.
- The death of the child is not direct intention of the procedure. It is the removal of the fallopian tube that saves the life of the mother, not causes the death of the child.
- The death of the child is not willed and would be avoided if at all possible—if, for example, re-implantation in the womb was reasonably possible.
- The life of the mother is, of course, equal to the life of the child.
Other references for Fallopian Pregnancy:
It is not true that there is no human DNA remaining in these vaccines. One researcher found over 140 ng of human DNA per vial, over 10 times the allowable FDA limit of 10 ng per vial. No Catholic should feel comfortable getting injected with fragments of DNA from an aborted child: https://cogforlife.org/2011/05/11/groups-call-for-federal-investigation-of-human-fetal-dnaautism-link-in-vaccines/
ReplyDeleteArchbishop Vigano: "From a moral point of view, for every Catholic who intends to remain faithful to his or her Baptism, it is absolutely inadmissible to accept a vaccination that utilizes material coming from human fetuses in its process of production." https://remnantnewspaper.com/web/index.php/articles/item/5031-letter-to-mothers-from-archbishop-vigano
It sounds as if you are grossed out by the 'ick' factor, which is a good thing.
ReplyDeleteWe also need to put things in context.
1. The claim is _not_ that there is no DNA from the aborted babies. The claim is that there is no intact DNA.
2. The COG reference is dealing with a different vaccine and an FDA guideline. The last time that I worked on a project that needed to meet FDA approval, the guidelines were not rules, but guides for accomplishing the goal.
The moral issue is one that I am interested in resolving for myself and my family. That is why I am researching the principles of the authoritative statement made by Rome as opposed to the statements made by ++Vigano and others.